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Introduction 
Public Law Litigation, 1  in which courts are requested to scrutinize the 
operation of large public interest institutions, has been a problematic phenomenon in 
many countries, including Asian countries like India and Japan, during the last two or 
three decades, and has raised critical debate regarding the judicial function. 
First of all, let me present two examples.  
First example: In the well-known “Unfair Juice Labeling Case” in Japan, the 
plaintiffs (the Federation of Housewives and its Chairwoman) attacked the Fair Trade 
Commission’s (FTC’s) finding in relation to the Japan Juice Association’s application 
for “a fair competition agreement relating to labeling of fruit juice beverages etc”, by 
bringing objection proceedings.2 The FTC and the aforementioned producer association 
prepared this agreement, because it had become an object of public concern that 
producers were using so much misleading labeling of fruit juice. The plaintiffs argued 
that the agreement approved by the FTC was oriented toward producer’s interest at the 
cost of fair and precise labeling and the interests of general consumer. However, the 
FTC dismissed this objection as lacking standing. Consequently, the plaintiffs brought a 
judicial review action to quash this dismissal measure. The Supreme Court delivered a 
judgment, which established the standard of standing needed for both the objection 
proceedings and the suit against administrative agencies. 
Only if the plaintiffs have suffered damage to a right or “a legally protected 
interest,” and moreover, only if this is concrete and individualistic, they will be entitled 
                                                 
 Institute of Developing Economies, Japan. 
1 Although it has been discussed under a variety of names, e.g., public law litigation or institutional litigation in the 
United States, public interest litigation or social action litigation in India, Gendaigata sosyo(the contemporary 
model litigation) in Japan, I would like to use the word “Public Law Litigation” as a neutral word, which refers to 
a litigation model that involves large public interests, without local characteristics. 
2 The Supreme Court, Showa Year 53 (1978) 13 February, Minshu vol.40 no.1 p.1. For more details of the case, S. 
Sugai & I Sonobe, Administrative Law in Japan, (Tokyo: Gyousei, 1999) pp.126-127. 
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to maintain proceedings and/or an action against an administrative disposition.3 The 
upshot of these requirements is that to be no more than a general consumer is to lack the 
necessary standing qualification.4 The Supreme Court dismissed this action. 
Second example: In India, an advocate filed a writ petition, which asked the 
Supreme Court to direct cinema halls to exhibit slides containing information and 
messages on the environment, free of cost, so that people could be made aware of their 
social obligations in matters of environment and be encouraged to avoid acting as 
polluters.5 The petition also asked that “environment” be made a compulsory subject in 
schools and colleges in order to spread general awareness. 
The Supreme Court of India, issuing many directions, held that licences of all 
cinema halls, touring cinemas and video parlors should be conditional on the exhibition, 
free of cost, of at least two slides on the environment in each show. The Court also 
directed Ministry of Environment to generate appropriate slide material within two 
months, and to start producing information films of short duration.  
Threshold issues like standing qualification were not raised at all, since in India, 
the standard of standing had been relaxed thoroughly in “public interest litigation.” The 
Supreme Court of India has declared that “a broad rule is evolved which gives the right 
of locus standi to any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient 
interest in instituting an action for redressal of public wrong or public injury.”6  
Although it can be observed that the Supreme Court of Japan has been relaxing 
the rule of standing gradually, there are a couple of other standards that prevent the 
public from pursuing an action in administrative litigation cases.  
How can we explain this difference between the situations in India and Japan? I 
find one answer in their ways of understanding the judicial function. 
I. The Features of Public Law Litigation 
Although Public Law Litigation is not defined precisely, it has been regarded as 
a departure from the traditional model of litigation. 
Chayes, observing the new movement of the judicial function in the United 
                                                 
3 Sugai & Sonobe, Id. p.127. 
4 In Japan, suits based on rights and duties of individual citizen’s interests form the center of administrative 
litigation. For suits that do not aim to protect individual plaintiff’s rights and interests but only aim to preserve the 
legal order, specific statutory provision is required. Sugai & Sonobe, Ibid. 
5 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 382. For more detail, S. Ahuja, People, Law and Justice – 
casebook on public interest litigation, vol.2, (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1997) pp.430-431. 
6 Janata Dal v. H.L. Chowdhary, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 892. 
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States, described the traditional lawsuit as “a vehicle for settling disputes between 
private parties about private rights.”7 According to him, the defining features of this 
type of civil adjudication are as follows: (1) The lawsuit is bipolar, (2) Litigation is 
retrospective, (3) Right and remedy are interdependent, (4) The lawsuit is a 
self-contained episode, (5) The process is party-initiated and party-controlled. 
By contrast, the public law model transposes many of the characteristics of the 
traditional litigation.8 (1) The scope of the lawsuit is shaped primarily by the court and 
parties, (2) The party structure is sprawling and amorphous, (3) The fact inquiry is 
predictive and legislative, (4) Relief is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible 
and broadly remedial lines, often having important consequences for many persons 
including absentees, (5) The remedy is not imposed but negotiated, (6) The decree does 
not terminate judicial involvement in the affair, its administration requires the 
continuing participation of the court, (7) The judge is not passive, but active, with 
responsibility not only for credible fact evaluation but for organizing and shaping the 
litigation to ensure a just and viable outcome, (8) The subject matter of the lawsuit is 
not a dispute between private individuals about private rights, but a grievance about the 
operation of public policy. 
In short, the “new” type of litigation is characterised as a public, multi-polar, 
and flexible forum for the airing of social grievance, while the traditional litigation is as 
a private, dualistic, and remedially limited system of dispute resolution. 
A variety of criticisms have been expressed on public law litigation cases.9 
Among them, the most powerful line of criticism argues that judicial behaviour in these 
cases might violate the traditional separation of powers principles. Those critics point 
out that the administration of institutions is an executive function, thus public law 
litigation cases, especially when the courts deliver innovative decisions, bypass 
majoritarian political controls. 
Although these critics may appear persuasive, we can certainly raise one 
question; is it possible to separate powers to three branches so neatly?  
                                                 
7 A. Chayes, “The role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,” Harvard Law Review, vol.89 no.7 p.1281 (1976) 
pp.1982-83. Another understanding of public law litigation can be found in, e.g., T. Eisenberg & S.C. Yeazel, 
“The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,” Harvard Law Review, vol.92 no.3 p.465 (1980). 
8 Chayes, Id. p.1302. 
9 For example: L.L. Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,” Harvard Law Review, vol.92 no.2 p.353 
(1978). 
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II. An Economic Approach to Public Law Litigation 
By using the terms “Law and Economics” or “Economic Analysis of Law”, the 
features of public law litigation can be described as follows10; (1) the new litigation 
cases have more “externalities” than the traditional cases, (2) in the new type cases, 
“asymmetries” and/or the lack of mutuality/interchangeability between plaintiffs and 
defendant, are acuter than the traditional cases, i.e. plaintiffs are always individual 
citizens or associations that do not have enough information or resources to pursue their 
actions, while defendants are usually governmental agencies or big companies. For the 
purpose of this paper, the former is worth mentioning more thoroughly. 
“Externalities” is defined as a cost or benefit that actions of one or more people 
imposes or confers on a third party or parties without their consent. According to Ota, 
there are three types of externalities in a judicial case.11 First, the commencement of 
action itself has externalities, which exert influences or impacts upon society. Secondly, 
remedies given by courts have externalities. The remedies may affect third parties who 
are not participants in the proceedings. Thirdly the interpretation or application of law 
itself is law-making by judges, thus this will affect third parties, because it will surely 
have some influence on similar cases that may occur in future. 
Because these externalities are more apparent, standing qualification has been 
the most problematic of the controversies in public law litigation cases, and also 
participation of the third parties to the litigation has been discussed frequently in these 
cases. Although it has been strongly supposed in legal theories that there are no legal 
effects on third parties who do not participate in the proceeding, externalities have 
inevitably been involved in all litigations, more or less.  
To sum up, the traditional litigation cases nevertheless involved those 
externalities, while these can be found more apparently in public law litigation cases. 
Thus a question arises. If both the traditional model and the new model have 
externalities, how can we say that the traditional model is inside the judicial function, 
and that the other is not? Furthermore, in parliamentary democracy, the interests of an 
organized sector, such as industry and labour, tend to be over-represented compared to 
the interests of an under-organized sector, such as general consumers; thus, the public 
law litigation cases have a role to provide one channel, which is supplementary to the 
                                                 
10 R. Cooter & T. Ulen, Law and Economics, (Harper Collins Publisher, 1988). S. Ota “Atarashii taipuno sosyo to 
Minji sosyo seido,” Jurisuto, vol. 91 p.58 (1991 Jan.). 
11 Ota, Ibid. 
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parliamentary and administrative procedures.12 
III. On the Principle of Separation of Power 
Chayes, listing six advantages of the judiciary in deciding the public law 
litigation cases, went further to discuss as follows:  
“In any event, I think, we have invested excessive time and energy in the effort 
to define—on the basis of the inherent nature of adjudication, the implications of a 
constitutional text, or the functional characteristics of courts – what the precise scope of 
judicial activity ought to be. Separation of powers comes in for a good deal of 
veneration in our political and judicial rhetoric, but it has always been hard to classify 
all government activity into three, and only three, neat and mutually exclusive 
categories. In practice, all governmental officials, including judges, have exercised a 
large and messy admixture of powers, and that is as it must be.”13  
“I am inclined … to urge…a willingness to accept a good deal of disorderly, 
pragmatic institutional overlap. After all, the growth of judicial power has been, in large 
part, a function of the failure of other agencies to respond to groups that have been able 
to mobilize considerable political resources and energy. And despite its new role, the 
judiciary is unlikely to displace its institutional rivals for governing power or even to 
achieve a dominant share of the market.”14 
It is clear from these quotations that what matters is how we perceive the 
judicial function. From this point of view, I would like to compare the situations in two 
countries, namely, Japan and India. However, more effort will be made to analyse the 
former than the latter. 
IV. Administrative Litigation in Japan  
1. A brief history of Administrative Litigation in Japan 
Before World War Ⅱ, Japan had the Administrative Litigation Court, which 
was independent from ordinary law courts.15 In 1889, the Meiji Constitution was 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 Chayes, op. cit. 1307. 
14 Id.1313. 
15 On the history of administrative law in Japan, J.O. Haley, “Japanese Administrative Law – Introduction,” Law in 
Japan, vol.19 p.1 (1986), H. Wada, “The Administrative Court under the Meiji Constitution” Law in Japan, vol.10 
p.1 (1977). Sugai & Sonobe, op. cit. pp.11-99.  
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introduced, which had Article 61 providing: 
“No suit at law, which relates to a right alleged to have been injured by illegal 
dispositions of administrative authorities and which shall come within the jurisdictions 
of the Court of Administrative Litigations, shall be taken cognizance of by a Court of 
law.” 
It is this provision that set a pattern for the future continental type 
administrative law that developed in Japan16. Only one Administrative Litigation Court 
existed as the first-instance and last-resort court, and the jurisdiction of the Court was 
very limited. The Administrative Court Act enacted in 1890, only listed assessment of 
taxes and their collection, refusal of trade-licenses and public work cases as litigious 
matters. 
In 1946, during the occupation by the Allies, the new constitution was enacted, 
and provided for administrative litigation just as for civil cases.17 As a result, the 
Administrative Litigation Court was abolished and replaced by ordinary law courts. The 
judicial system was transformed from a continental law system with an administrative 
litigation court to Anglo-American type administrative lawsuit proceedings by ordinary 
law courts. However, Japanese administrative law has never done away with the old 
theories of administrative litigation, as can be seen from the fact that the Administrative 
Case Litigation Act of 1962 (ACLA) changed the system back again into a peculiar 
system, in which ordinary law courts act “as if they were direct descendants of the 
administrative litigation court of the old days.”18  
Why has such a curious thing been happening? 
2. The “Osaka Airport Case” 
In the well-known “Osaka Airport Case,” the plaintiffs, bringing a civil action 
from the court of first instance, demanded for injunctive relief to curtail the use of a 
state-run airport.19 Against the judgment of the appeal court, which not only affirmed 
the injunction but also extended the time period covered by it, the further appeal to the 
Supreme Court resulted in a judgment holding that the action was an inappropriate form 
                                                 
16 Sugai & Sonobe, op. cit. p.26. 
17 Article 76 provided that the “whole judicial power should be vested in law courts.” This clause means that the 
power of adjudicating administrative litigations should be included, so that not only civil and criminal cases but 
also administrative cases would be included in the “whole judicial power.” 
18 Sugai & Sonobe, op. cit. p.30. 
19 The Grand Bench of the Supreme Court, Showa Year 56 (1981) 16 December, Minsyu vol.35 no.10 p.1369. For 
more details, J.O.Haley, op. cit. p.13, Sugai & Sonobe, op. cit. p.121. 
 6
of action. The reason given was that a “civil law” application for an injunction is an 
incorrect use of the law, since the matter applied to a “state-run airport”. 
As Sonobe analysed, the judgment clearly distinguishes between civil suits and 
administrative suits, regardless of the fact that under the ACLA, it is stated that 
administrative litigation is to be treated as a special branch within civil litigation.20 
Although this is a problem of the difference in procedure of the same Court of Justice, 
there is a further problem. Whether the ACLA include injunction as a final remedial 
measure against the administrative bodies or not remains undecided. In short, the 
Court’s decision left the plaintiffs with no clear avenue to challenge the operation of the 
state-run airport. 
Under the ACLA, a court will review an agency determination only if it 
involved an administrative disposition (gyosei syobun). This test is extremely important, 
as Dziubla regarded this test as a barrier to administrative litigation21. If agency action 
involved an administrative disposition, then review lies under the Act, if it did not, then 
review lies, if it exists at all, under ordinary civil procedure rules22. According to the 
Supreme Court, “the term phrase disposition by an administrative agency does not refer 
to all action that an agency takes based on law. Rather, it refers to those actions based on 
law that a national or public organization takes that directly structure or determine the 
rights and duties of citizens.”23  For example, if an agency rejects/permits some 
applications, such as license application (the disposition of applications), or if an agency 
orders a store to close for selling spoiled food (disadvantageous dispositions), it 
determines the rights of the citizens and it is an administrative disposition, thus subject 
itself to judicial review. 
However, it is not clear in the ACLA, other statutes and case law whether there 
exist any administrative dispositions in a case like “Osaka airport.” Because this action 
was brought at the stage of operating public facilities and there is no clear 
                                                 
20 Sugai & Sonobe, Ibid. 
21 R.W. Dziubla, “The impotent sword of Japanese justice: the doctrine of Syobunnsei as a barrier to administrative 
litigation,” Cornell International Law Journal, vol.18 p.37 (1985). He pointed out two problems that can result 
from this test. The first problem is that individual rights may suffer because by the time judicial review is allowed, 
the court is faced with a fait accompli that it is unwilling to undo. The second is that the delay in judicial review 
of administrative actions causes administrative agency personnel to develop increased bureaucratic insularity. 
22 J.M. Ramseyer & M. Nakazato, Japanese Law – an economic approach, (Chicago: The university of Chicago 
Press, 1999) p.196. 
23 The Supreme Court, Showa Year 39 (1964) 29 October, Minsyu vol.18 no.8 p.1809. Ramseyer & Nakazato, Id. 
p.197. This definition of justiciability is terribly restrictive compared to American standards, Dziubla, op. cit. 
p.44. 
 7
administrative disposition at that stage24. So there is a possibility that, although the 
Supreme Court suggested that suits like “Osaka Airport” should come from 
administrative litigation procedure, the review may not lie on this kind of disputes under 
the Japanese administrative litigation system. 
3. Lack of effective remedies 
The corresponding side of this concept “administrative disposition” is the lack 
of effective remedies. The ACLA provides the annulment action, which is a demand for 
quashing the administrative disposition, as a main remedy (Torikeshi Sosho (lawsuit 
seeking the annulment of administrative measures)), supported by a remedy for a failure 
to act (Fusakui Iho Kakunin Sosho (lawsuit for confirmation of illegality of 
nonfeasance)).25  
In the case of annulment action, the applicant must find some administrative 
disposition to be the subject-matter of the proceedings. In the case of omission, 
proceedings for a failure to act cannot be brought unless the qualified applicant has first 
addressed a formal request for administrative dispositions to the defendant. 
The actions, which do not come within one of the categories provided by the 
Act, are called implied complaint actions (Mumei Koukoku Sosho (innominate action)). 
Although actions similar to Anglo-American injunctions and mandamus suits 
compelling the government to do or refrain from doing specified actions have been 
discussed as implied complaint actions, whether this type of actions could be recognized 
or not has remained vague. 
3.1 Approaches to mandamus 
The typical case of proceedings for a failure to act (Fusakui Iho Kakunin 
Sosho) is that, when the administrative authorities have to make some disposition within 
a due period on a citizen’s application based on law, for example on an application for a 
license to run a store, and after the period there are no reply from the agency. Then the 
citizen can sue to have the illegality of official omission established. The result of this 
suit is to confirm some obligation of administrative agencies to act. 
                                                 
24 Dziubla argues that the doctrine of administrative disposition delays judicial review of administrative actions until 
a time when any review would be futile. Dziubla, op. cit. p38. 
25 For more details, Haley, op. cit. pp.7-8, Dziubla, op. cit. pp.41-42, Ramseyer & Nakazato, op. cit. pp.196-202, 
Sugai & Sonobe, op. cit. p.134. As mentioned earlier, it should be noted that in the ACLA, there is no procedure 
equivalent to the Anglo-American Action for a declaration or injunction. The courts cannot consider the legal 
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This is the nearest the Japanese have come to mandamus. According to Sugai, 
“the timid Japanese law approached mandamus with several fits of hesitation, but in 
spite of that, it was an improvement on the old law, according to which only an 
annulment of illegal administrative dispositions was allowed, whereas ordering and 
compelling administrative agencies to act and do something was held to be against the 
separation of powers doctrine and alleged therefore to be unconstitutional.”26 
However, can a citizen demand that a court should order administrative bodies 
to give an applicant a license? The Act does not list such a remedy. Then, in Japan this 
type of litigation has been discussed as implied complaint action.  
In the early days of post-World War Ⅱ, the legal scholars and the courts 
decided that this action was impermissible, because only after an administrative 
disposition had been given, the litigation should lie against administrative bodies; 
otherwise, the separation of power doctrines would be infringed. However, by now, 
almost all scholars and also the courts may accept this type of suit, mainly because the 
concept of ripeness has been imported from United States.27 
Although this bipolar type (applicant v. administrative agency) innominate 
action for duty-imposing suits (Gimmu Zuke Sosho) is basically accepted by legal 
scholars and the courts by now, the multi-polar type is not. Suppose there is a company 
that causes pollution, and residents brought a suit in a court demanding a judgment that 
orders an administrative agency in charge to invoke its regulatory power against that 
company. In this case, there are normally no statutorily provided application procedures 
for citizens to invoke regulatory power of administrative agency; thus, the citizen 
cannot utilize the remedy for a failure to act. As long as otherwise provided by some 
specific statutory provisions, this type of action has not been accepted as a remedy in 
the field of administrative law in Japan, since it is thought that it would destroy the 
balance of power between the judiciary and the executive.28 
3.2 Approaches to injunction 
The other type of implied complaint action having been discussed is injunction. 
The annulment action for quashing administrative disposition certainly has an effect 
similar to that of the injunction, but this is available only if administrative dispositions 
                                                                                                                                               
position of the applicant in the abstract without specific statutory provisions. 
26 Sugai & Sonobe, op.cit. p.84. 
27 K. Shiraishi, “Kohojyo no Gimukakuninsosyo ni tsuite,” Koho Kenkyu, vol.11 p.46 (1954). 
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precede the suit. The feature of this suit is ex post facto. Are there any possibilities 
whether the demand for an injunction against administrative agencies lies in the case 
where no administrative disposition has been delivered yet or in the case where there is 
no clear administrative disposition, like the Osaka Airport case? 
Suppose that an administrative agency is about to give a permit to a person 
who applied to build an apartment building. Then the residents nearby worried about 
environmental effects that will be caused by this construction. The residents bring suit 
in a court demanding an injunction against the administrative agency to refrain the 
agency from giving a permit. It seems that this type of innominate action would be 
accepted, with strict conditions.29 
Then how about the Osaka Airport type? As mentioned before, there are no 
clear answers, although some scholars are discussing the possibility of allowing similar 
type of injunction in civil proceedings by some innovative interpretations.30 
4. Analyses 
What are the reasons for these difficulties in bringing actions and getting 
remedies against the administrative agencies in Japan? One reason is that the ALCA 
provides as its main remedy the annulment action that quashes the administrative 
disposition. Behind this format of the Act, there is a strong hypothesis that the judicial 
review of the administrative actions is a tool to correct the illegality that was caused by 
administrative dispositions after administrative bodies exercised their rights to first 
decision (Daiichiji Handan Ken, right to judge the matter first) and thus made 
authorization determinations.31 One judgment by a district court says that “in the light 
of separation of power, it is the administrative agency that will decide first whether the 
executive power is to be exercised or not, and jurisdiction of an ordinary court in 
administrative litigation cases should basically remain ex post review to judge whether 
the administrative disposition is legal or not after the executive branch has decided the 
matter.”32  
Then what is the right to first decision of administrative agencies? It is now 
clear that first, administrative agencies hold the rights whether or not to exercise their 
                                                                                                                                               
28 For example: H. Shiono, Gyoseiho dainihan, (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1994) pp.185-194.  
29 Id. pp.190-193. 
30 Id. pp.193-195. 
31 K. Ohama, “Mumeikokku sosyo to Shihoken,” in Sensyu Daigaku Imamura Horitsu Kenkyusitsu ho, vol.17 p.33 
(1990) pp.37-43. 
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powers, and second, administrative agencies can decide the matter independently to 
achieve the best results. 
The next question is this. Why should the ordinary courts defer to the first 
decision rights of administrative agencies? It is widely regarded that the executive 
function is to achieve the public purposes or policies, while the judiciary holds only a 
passive function that applies law to certain litigation and it is not a branch that achieves 
goals actively. That is to say, the judiciary cannot exercise the right to first decisions to 
achieve statutory goals. 
As some scholars have pointed out, this thought has its origin in particular 
understanding of the separation of power principle under the Meiji Constitution, where 
it was considered that judicial control over the executive is an infringement of executive 
power by the judiciary.33 
Under the Meiji constitution, the emperor had all the power and only when it 
infringed the rights of property or freedom of the subjects, was the power regulated by 
law. However, it seems to me that, under the new constitution, the executive is given its 
base to act only by constitution and statutes enacted by the legislature, the 
representatives of the people, and the judiciary must control the executive if it violates 
law, regardless of exercising its right to first decision. Furthermore, the judiciary under 
the new constitution, which is based on the supreme consideration of liberty and rights 
of individuals, has a role to protect human rights. In other words, the new constitution 
established the rule of law in Japan.34 
 
V. Public Interest Litigation in India 
India has developed quite a different pattern of judicial function in 
administrative litigation cases. It is in Public Interest Litigation cases, a large part of 
which involve the omissions of the executive branch, that the judiciary in India showed 
its innovative operation, as Barr evaluated it as the world’s most active judiciary.35  
Its distinctive characteristics include liberalization of the rules of standing, 
                                                                                                                                               
32 Nigata District Court, Showa Year 54 (1979) 30 December, Gyosyu vol.30 no.3 p.671. 
33 For example, S. Takayanagi, Gyoseihoriron no Saikosei, (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1985) pp.1-5, Ohama, op. cit. 
pp.37-43. 
34 Takayanagi, op.cit.. pp.1-22, Ohama, op .cit. pp.41-43. 
35 C. Baar, “Social Action Litigation in India: the Operation and Limits of the World’s Most Active Judiciary,” in 
Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy, eds. D.W. Jackson and C.N. Tate (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1992) pp.77-87. 
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procedural flexibility, a creative and activist interpretation of legal and fundamental 
rights, and remedial flexibility and ongoing judicial participation and supervision.36 
Why could the judiciary in India carry out such decisive action? Needless to say, there 
are many factors to be considered, I would like to cast light on the perception of the 
judicial function that appeared in the decisions delivered by the Supreme Court. 
In S. P. Gupta v. Union of India,37 in which the plaintiffs contended that a 
circular letter issued by the Law Minister infringed the independence of the judiciary, 
Justice Bhagwati directly discussed the judicial function.  
“ …there may be cases where the State or a public authority may act in 
violation of a constitutional or statutory obligation or fail to carry out such obligation, 
resulting in injury to public interest… Who would have standing to complain against 
such act or omission of the State or public authority? …To answer these questions it is 
first of all necessary to understand what is the true purpose of the Judicial function … Is 
the judicial function primarily aimed at preserving legal order by confining the 
legislative and executive organs of government within their powers in the interest of the 
public or is it mainly directed towards the protection of private individuals by 
preventing illegal encroachment on their individual rights? The first intention rests on 
the theory that Courts are the final arbiters of what is legal and illegal … We would 
regard the first proposition as correctly setting out the nature and purpose of the judicial 
function, as it is essential to the maintenance of the rule of law that every organ of the 
State must act within the limits of its power and carry out the duty imposed upon it by 
the Constitution or the law …”38 
The judicial function in administrative litigation, as understood by Bhagwati, is 
                                                 
36 There are numerous articles on Public Interest Litigation in India, for example, J. Cassels, “Judicial Activism and 
Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible,” the American Journal of Comparative Law, vol.37 
no.3 Summer 1989 pp.495-519. P.N. Bhagwati, “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation,” Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, vol.23 1985 pp.561-577. Idem, “Social Action Litigation: the Indian Experience,” 
in The Role of Judiciary in Plural Societies, eds. N. Tirucheruvam and R. Coomaraswamy (London: Frances 
Printer, 1987) pp.20-31. R. Dhavan, “Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India,” Journal of Indian Law 
Institute, vol.36 no.3 July-Sept. 1994 pp.302-338, C.D. Cunningham, “Public Interest Litigation in the Indian 
Supreme Court: a study in the light of American experience,” Journal of Indian Law Institute, vol.29 no.4 
Oct.-Dec. 1987 pp.494-523. S.K. Agrawala, Public interest litigation in India: a critique, (Bombay: Tripathi, 
1985). U. Baxi, “Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India,” in The Role 
of …, pp.32-60. 
37 A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149. pp. 189-190. 
38 Id. p.190. He went further to discuss as follows: “If public duties are to be enforced and social collective diffused 
rights and interest are to be protected, we have to utilize the initiative and zeal of public-minded persons and 
organizations by allowing them to move the Court and act for a general or group interest, even though they may 
not be directly injured in their own rights. It is for this reason that in public interest litigation—litigation 
undertaken for the purpose of redressing public injury--enforcing public duty protecting social, collective, 
diffused rights and interests or vindicating public interest, and a citizen who is acting bona fide and who has 
sufficient interest has to accord standing.” 
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not passive but active, and it can be said that he perceived that the judiciary as well as 
the executive is obliged to achieve public, statutory, and constitutional purposes. 
In contrast, according to P. Shin, Justice Mukharji followed the path of judicial 
self-restraint.39 In State of H.P. v. Umed Ram, a case involved in road constructions to  
the hilly areas, Mukharji pointed out that “judicial review of administrative action or 
inaction where there is an obligation for action should be with caution and not in 
haste,”40 and concluded that it was the legislature that were entitled to fix priorities for 
expenditure to satisfy basic needs of the people, upon the judgment and 
recommendation of the executive. However, at the same time, he also said, “To the 
residents of the hilly areas as far as feasible and possible, society has a constitutional 
obligation to provide roads for communication.”41 In short, in this case, Mukharji took 
an expansive interpretation of the constitutional right to life, while taking a cautious 
view of judicial function to enforce that right.  
From Japanese eyes, Mukharji’s view is judicial activism rather than judicial 
self-restraint. Surely he showed the way of judicial deference to the legislature and the 
executive in the sphere of remedy, but he did not defer to them at all in deciding what is 
the right of the people and what is the purpose of the constitution. 
Conclusion 
It is true that there are many other reasons and factors to be considered, but I 
am sure that it is clear from the above discussions that one reason why the judicial 
behaviour in cases where large public interest is involved differs between Japan and 
India lies in the way the judicial function is perceived.  
As judicial reform has been taking place in many Asian countries, and also as 
the rise of litigations that involve large public interest is inevitable in modern society, I 
believe that it is important to re-think the judicial function, because “it is first of all 
necessary to understand what is the true purpose of the judicial function”42 to deal with 
the cases, as Bhagwati described. 
                                                 
39 P. Singh, “Justice Savyasachi Mukharji’s perception of Judicial Function in Public Interest Litigation – a tribute,” 
Delhi Law Review, vol.13 (1991) p.145. 
40 A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 847, p.855. 
41 Ibid. 
42 A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149. pp. 189-190. 
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